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1 Introduction
In Chaitin [1995] there is a conversation between Gregory Chaitin and Kurt
Go¨del:
[Chaitin] said, “Professor Go¨del, I’m fascinated by your incomplete-
ness theorem. I have a new proof based on Berry paradox that I’d
like to tell you about.” Go¨del said, “It doesn’t matter which paradox
you use.”
To support this claim, we need to investigate what will happen if we formalize
different paradoxes in Peano arithmetic (PA). Most notably, Chaitin proved a
version of the First Incompleteness Theorem with a proof resembling the Berry
paradox in his Chaitin [1971], so did George Boolos gave his proof using the
same paradox (independently) in Boolos [1998].
In this paper1, I will present a few infinitary paradoxes and corresponding
undecidable sentences. The first three paradoxes are developed, in my master
thesis, from a version of the Preface paradox, and the last one is an infinite
version of the Surprise Examination paradox from Sorensen [1993].
We will work in the usual first order Peano arithmetic, though in fact the
results hold in any theory that extends PA. The non-logical symbols in the
language are the only constant symbol 0, a unary function symbol S and two
binary function symbols + and ×.
The technique being used to produce undecidable sentences in this paper, in-
volving a general version of the Diagonal Lemma, is mainly from Cies`lin`ski and Urbaniak
[2013].
2 Preliminaries
In this section, I will state a few facts and definitions that are useful in this
paper, proofs of those facts and details of the arithmetization of syntax will be
skipped. These details can be found in books about Go¨del’s Incompleteness
Theorems, for examples, Smullyan [1992] and Smith [2007].
There are formulas in PA that are said to be provable. If a formula ϕ is
provable in Peano arithmetic, we will denote this fact by ⊢ ϕ. Then we have
some definitions:
1. A formula ϕ is said to be refutable if the negation of it, ¬ϕ, is provable.
1This paper was presented in Logic Colloquium 2015, and the results are from my mater’s
thesis Cheng [2015].
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2. A formula is decidable if it is provable or refutable, otherwise it is unde-
cidable. Hence a formula ϕ is undecidable if neither ϕ nor ¬ϕ is provable.
3. Two formulae ϕ and ψ are provable equivalent if the formula ϕ ←→ ψ is
provable.
4. A quantifier is bounded in a formula if it is of the form ∃x(x < t ∧ ϕ)
or ∀x(x < t → ϕ), where t is a term, and we will write (∃x < t)ϕ and
(∀x < t)ϕ respectively.
5. A formula is a ∆0 formula if it is provably equivalent to a formula con-
taining only bounded quantifiers.
6. A formula is a Σ1 formula if it is provably equivalent to a formula of the
form ∃xϕ, where ϕ is a ∆0 formula.
We say that a theory is consistent if there is no formula ϕ such that both
ϕ and ¬ϕ are provable. And we say that a theory is ω-consistent if there is no
open formula ϕ(x) such that ∃xϕ(x) is provable, but for every natural number
n, ϕ(n) is not provable. In this paper we assume PA is both consistent and
ω-consistent.2
The following corollary of the assumption of ω-consistency is useful:
Lemma 1. Let ϕ(x) be a Σ1 formula with a free variable x. If ∃xϕ(x) is
provable, then there is a number n such that ϕ(n) is provable.
This result simply follows from the definition of ω-consistency and the fact
that all ∆0 formulae are decidable.
Another lemma about Σ1 formulae is also useful:
Lemma 2. If ϕ is a Σ1 formula, then for any variable x, ∃xϕ is also a Σ1
formula.
A proof of this lemma can be found in Smullyan [1992].
We can encode each finite sequence of natural numbers into a natural num-
ber, call the code of the sequence, in a way that we can also decode that number
and obtain the original sequence. A number which is the code of a finite se-
quence is called a code number.
Then we assign different numbers to the symbols in our object language,
hence every expression corresponds to a finite sequence, which can be encoded
into a natural number. Such a number is called the Go¨del number of that
expression. Let ϕ be a formula, the Go¨del number of ϕ will be denoted by pϕq.
After that, (syntactical) properties and relations of expressions correspond
to properties and relations of the Go¨del numbers of expressions. Then we can
construct the following predicates and functions3:
1. Code(x) is provable if x is a code number.
2. l(x) = n is provable if x is a code number of a sequence with length n.
2The latter actually implies the former and can be replaced by weaker a weaker condition
called 1-consistency (or Σ1 soundness), which also implies consistency.
3Since we usually do not include function symbols other than S, + and ×, “f(x) = y”
should be understood as a relation of x and y and “f(x)” should be understood as pterms (p
for pseudo) in [Boolos 1993].
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3. Dec(x, k) = y is provable if x is a code number and the kth term of the
sequence encoded by x is y.
4. Neg(x) is a function such that Neg(pϕq) = p¬ϕq is provable for any
formula varphi.4
5. Subs(x, v, y) is a function such that if for any formula ϕ, term t, variable
vi free in ϕ, then Sub(pϕq, pviq, ptq) = pϕ(t/vi)q, where ϕ(t/vi) is the
formula obtained from substituting all free occurrence of vi in ϕ by t, is
provable.
The above relations are ∆0. We also have an open Σ1 formula Prov(x) with
one free variable satisfying the following two lemmas:
Lemma 3 (Prov-introduction). If ϕ is a provable formula, then Prov(pϕq) is
provable.
Lemma 4 (Prov-elimination). If Peano arithmetic is ω-consistent, and ϕ is a
formula such that Prov(pϕq) is provable, then ϕ is provable.
Since we assume the consistency and ω-consistency of PA, Prov(pϕq) is
provable if and only if ϕ is provable for any formula ϕ.
Finally we need two more lemmas. The first one is a generalized version of
the usual Diagonal Lemma, the proof of it can be found in Boolos [1993]:
Lemma 5 (Generalized Diagonal Lemma). Let ϕ(x, y) be an open formula with
two free variables x, y, then there is an open formula ψ(x) with one free variable
x such that ψ(x)←→ ϕ(x, pψ(x)q) is provable.
The second one is a consequence of Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem:
Lemma 6. Let ϕ be a sentence, then ¬Prov(pϕq) is not provable.
3 The Paradoxes
In this section I will present four infinitary paradoxes, the first three of them
are from my master thesis, though there are some similar finite version in the
literature, I cannot find any name for the infinitary ones. The last one is called
the Earliest Class Inspection paradox from Sorensen [1993], as noted in the
introduction.
Imagine there are infinitely many people in a room, each of them say one
and only one sentence. The following three situations correspond to the first
three paradoxes.
Paradox 1: Someone is wrong.
If everyone in the room says “Someone is wrong” 5, then it is impossible for
everyone to be right, otherwise none of them is wrong, contradicting their claims.
Hence someone must be wrong, but that person also says “Someone is wrong”,
so “No one is wrong” is true, contradicting him or her being wrong.
4In fact for any expressions, not restricted to formulas, but here we only concern formulas.
5To be more precise, it should be “At least one sentence uttered in this room is false”. But
for convenience, we simply talk about people being right and wrong instead of the sentences
they uttered is true or false.
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Paradox 2: Someone else is wrong.
If everyone in the room says “Someone else is wrong”, then this situation is
slightly more complicated. It is consistent that there is exactly one person
being wrong, while the rest of them are right. Furthermore, since everyone says
the same thing and it is a symmetric situation, it does not matter that which
one is wrong. So the truth value assignments of their sentence is arbitrary in
this sense, which is similar to the Truth-teller paradox, i.e. “This sentence is
true”.
Paradox 3: Some people are wrong.
Suppose all people in the room queue up, and the kth person says “There are
at least k people wrong”. Notice that if the kth person is right, then everyone
before this person is also right.6 Similarly, if the kth person is wrong, then
everyone after this person is also wrong.
Using logic we know that either everyone is right or someone is wrong, in
both cases the first person is right.7 Since the first person is right, someone
must be wrong, and there must be someone who is the first person (in the
queue) being wrong. Let this person be the kth person. By our observation
everyone after her or him is wrong, so there are more than k people wrong, but
that means the kth person is right, and we have a contradiction.
Paradox 4: The Earliest Class Inspection Paradox
Suppose you are a new teacher, and you are told that there will be a class
inspection. There are two conditions on the date of the inspection: first, the
sooner the better; second, you do not know and cannot guess the day so that
you cannot prepare for it. Therefore, the inspection will be on the first day
which you do not believe there will be a class inspection.
Now, the next school day is the first available day for class inspection, but
then the inspection cannot be on that day since you can reason it. Similarly you
can rule out the possibilities of the inspection being on the second day, the third
day, the fourth day, and so on. Hence the earliest unexpected class inspection
is impossible.
Notes on the paradoxes
Here are some notes on the paradoxes.
The finite version of the first paradox, which is still a paradox, is related
to the Liar cycles.8 However an existential quantifier is informally used in this
paradox, and it can be extended to the infinite case easily, unlike the Liar cycles.
The finite version of the second paradox is again similar to the infinite case,
that is, we have different consistent truth-value assignments. It is related to a
paradox by Jean Buridan, which is “Socrates says that Plato tells a lie, Plato
6Since the kth person is right, there are at least k people wrong. Hence for any j < k, it
is true that there are at least j people wrong, which means the jth person is right.
7If everyone is right, then of course the first person is right; if someone is wrong, then at
least one person is wrong, which is what the first person asserts.
8That is, the people are in a circle, and everyone says the next person is wrong, with an
exception that if the number of people is even, then one of them says the next one is right.
4
says that Socrates tells a lie” (and they say nothing more), it is also called the
No-No paradox in Sorensen [2004]. In Sorensen’s book, there is a finite version
of the second paradox.9
The finite version of the third paradox is not necessarily a paradox: if the
number of people is even, then the first half people are right and the second half
wrong; if the number of people is odd, then the one who is in the exact middle
of the queue is in a Liar paradox situation. And the infinite version resembles
the Yablo’s paradox10
The Earliest Class Inspection Paradox can be regarded as an infinite version
of the Surprise Examination Paradox.
4 The Undecidable Sentences
In Cies`lin`ski and Urbaniak [2013], the authors apply Lemma 5 to an open for-
mula to obtain undecidable sentences resembling Yablo’s paradox. In the fol-
lowing, we will do the same for the paradoxes in the last section.
Formalizing Paradox 1
Consider the open formula11:
∃z
(
Prov
(
Neg(Subs(y, pxq, pzq))
))
∧ (0 ≤ x)
By Lemma 5 there is an open formula P(x) with one free variable x such that:
⊢ P(x)←→ ∃z
(
Prov
(
Neg(Subs(pP(x)q, pxq, pzq))
))
∧ (0 ≤ x)
⇒ ⊢ P(x)←→ ∃z
(
Prov(p¬P(z)q)
)
∧ (0 ≤ y)
⇒ ⊢ P(x)←→ ∃z
(
Prov(p¬P(z)q)
)
Here P(k) can be read as the sentence that the kth person says, which is,
intuitively, “There is someone whose sentence is refutable”. Like the undecidable
sentence in Go¨del original proof, which is a formalization of the Liar paradox,
we replace “truth” by “provability”, since the latter can be formulated in the
object language.
We have the following result:
Theorem 7. For any natural number k, P(k) is undecidable.
Proof. Let k be a natural number. Suppose P(k) is provable. Then by the
choice of P(x), ∃z
(
Prov(p¬P(z)q)
)
is also provable. By ω-consistency of PA,
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, there is a natural number n such that ¬Prov(pP(n)q)
is provable. But by Lemma 6 this is impossible.
9In almost the same form, except that he uses a list of 100 sentences, each of them is the
sentence “Some other sentence on this list is false”.
10Yablo’s paradox is about an infinite list of sentences where every sentence is “All sentences
below are false”. If the first sentence is true, then the second one is false, hence some sentence
below it is true, contradicting the first one. On the other hand, if the first sentence is false,
then some sentence below it is true, and we will get a similar contradiction.
11The subformula 0 ≤ x is to make sure the formula contains x as a free variable. It is not
difficult to prove that 0 ≤ x is provable.
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On the other hand, suppose P(k) is refutable. Then:
⊢ ¬P(k)⇒ ⊢ ¬∃z
(
Prov(p¬P(z)q)
)
(By the choice of P(x))
⇒ ⊢ ∀z¬Prov(p¬P(z)q)
⇒ ⊢ ¬Prov(p¬P(k)q) (By universal instantiation)
While by Lemma 3, we have Prov(p¬P(k)q) provable. Since we assume that
PA is consistent, this is impossible.
Therefore for any natural number k, P(k) is neither provable nor refutable,
hence undecidable.
Formalizing Paradox 2
Consider the following open formula:
∃z
(
z 6= x ∧ Prov
(
Neg(Subs(y, pxq, pzq))
))
By Lemma 5, there is an open formula Q(x) with one free variable x such that
⊢ Q(x)←→ ∃z
(
z 6= x ∧ Prov(p¬Q(z)q)
)
Similar to the previous formalization, Q(k) can be read as the sentence that
the kth person says, which is, intuitively, “There is someone else whose sentence
is refutable”.
We have the following result:
Theorem 8. For any natural number k, Q(k) is undecidable.
Proof. Let k be a natural number. Suppose Q(k) is refutable. Then:
⊢ ¬Q(k)⇒ ⊢ ¬∃z
(
z 6= k ∧ Prov(p¬Q(z)q)
)
(By the choice of Q(x))
⇒ ⊢ ∀z
(
Prov(p¬Q(z)q)→ z = k
)
⇒ ⊢ ∀z
(
z 6= k → ¬Prov(p¬Q(z)q)
)
⇒ ⊢
(
k + 1 6= k → ¬Prov(p¬Q(k + 1)q)
)
(By Universal Instantiation)
⇒ ⊢ ¬Prov(p¬Q(k + 1)q) (⊢ k + 1 6= k)
But by Lemma 6, ¬Prov(p¬Q(k+1)q) is not provable. Hence Q(k) cannot
be refutable.
On the other hand, suppose Q(k) is provable, then by the choice of Q(x),
∃z
(
z 6= k∧Prov(p¬Q(z)q)
)
is also provable. By ω-consistency of PA, Lemma 2
and Lemma 1, there is a natural number n such that Prov(p¬Q(n)q) is provable.
By Lemma 4, ¬Q(n) is also provable. But this contradicts the first half of
this proof, hence Q(k) cannot be provable.
Therefore for any natural number k, Q(k) is undecidable.
We have noted the similarity between paradox 2 and the Truth-teller para-
dox. Nevertheless, the Henkin sentence, the formalized Truth-teller, is provable
by Lo¨b’s celebrated theorem, while the formalized version of paradox 2 above
is undecidable.
Formalizing Paradox 3
To formalize the third paradox, it is more complicated since we need to refer
to a set of numbers (of size k) in the object language. So we need a two more
definitions:
• HetSeq(x) ←→ Code(x) ∧
(
∀y ≤ l(x)
)(
∀z ≤ l(x)
)(
y 6= z → Dec(y, x) 6=
Dec(z, x)
)
If HetSeq(x) is provable, then x is a code number of a sequence where no
two terms are the same.
• Ele(x, y)←→ Code(y) ∧
(
∃u ≤ l(y)
)(
Dec(u, y) = x
)
If Ele(x, y) is provable, then x represents a number which is a term of the
sequence represented by y.
The idea is to define a kind of sequence, called heterosequence, in which no two
terms are the same. Instead of saying there is a set of k natural numbers, we
can say there is a heterosequence of length k. Note that both HetSeq(x) and
Ele(x, y) are ∆0.
Then consider the open formula:
∃z
[
HetSeq(z)∧l(z) = Sx∧(∀t ≤ z)
[
Ele(t, z)→ Prov
(
Neg(Subs(y, pxq, ptq))
)]]
Again by Lemma 5 there is an open formula R(x) such that:
⊢ R(x)←→ ∃z
(
HetSeq(z)∧
(
l(z) = Sx
)
∧(∀t ≤ z)
(
Ele(t, z)→ Prov(p¬R(t)q)
))
Intuitively, R(k) is provable if and only if there is a heterosequence of length
k + 1 such that for each element t of that sequence, R(t) is refutable.12
We have the following two lemmas:
Lemma 9. If m,n are natural numbers and m < n, then ⊢ R(n)→ R(m).
Proof. Let m,n be natural numbers and m < n. Suppose ⊢ R(n). Then by the
choice of R(x):
⊢ ∃z
(
HetSeq(z) ∧
(
l(z) = Sn
)
∧ (∀t ≤ z)
(
Ele(t, z)→ Prov(p¬R(t)q)
))
By ω-consistency, there is a natural number N such that
⊢
(
HetSeq(N) ∧
(
l(N) = Sn
)
∧ (∀t ≤ N)
(
Ele(t, N)→ Prov(p¬R(t)q)
))
N is the code number of a heterosequence of length n+1, then we can take
the first m+ 1 terms of the sequence to form a new heterosequence, and let its
code number be M . By definition, both l(b) = Sm and Ele(t,M)→ Ele(t, N)
are provable, hence
⊢
(
HetSeq(M) ∧
(
l(b) = Sm
)
∧ (∀t ≤M)
(
Ele(t,M)→ Prov(p¬R(t)q)
))
Therefore ⊢ R(m). By the deduction theorem we get ⊢ R(n)→ R(m).
Lemma 10. If m,n are natural numbers and m > n, then ⊢ ¬R(n)→ ¬R(m).
Proof. By Lemma 9 we have ⊢ R(m)→ R(n), which implies the contrapositive
of the formula, therefore ⊢ ¬R(n)→ ¬R(m).
12The length of the heterosequence is k + 1, since we count the natural numbers from 0.
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These two lemmas formalize our previous observations in the situation of
paradox 3: “if the kth person is right then everyone before him or her is right”
and “if the kth person is wrong then everyone after her or him is wrong”.
Then we have the following result:
Theorem 11. For any natural number n, R(n) is undecidable.
Proof. Let n be a natural number. Suppose R(n) is refutable, then ⊢ ¬R(n).
By Lemma 10, for every m > n, R(m) is refutable. Therefore the sentences
¬R(n),¬R(n + 1), . . . ,¬R(n + n) are all provable, by Lemma 3 the sentences
Prov(p¬R(n)q), P rov(p¬R(n+1)q), . . . , P rov(p¬R(n+n)q) are also provable.
Let c be the code number of the sequence (n, n+1, . . . , n+n). Then the sen-
tences HetSeq(c), l(c) = Sn, and (∀t ≤ c)
(
Ele(t, c)→ Prov(p¬R(t)q)
)
are all
provable. This implies that R(n) is provable and we get another contradiction.
On the other hand, suppose R(n) is provable. Then
∃z
(
HetSeq(z) ∧
(
l(z) = Sn
)
∧ (∀t ≤ z)
(
Ele(t, z)→ Prov(p¬R(t)q)
))
is also provable. By ω-consistency, there is an number c such that
⊢
(
HetSeq(c) ∧ l(c) = Sn ∧ (∀t ≤ c)
(
Ele(t, c)→ Prov(p¬R(t)q)
))
⇒ ⊢ (∀t ≤ c)
(
Ele(t, c)→ Prov(p¬R(t)q))
))
(By conjunction elimination)
⇒ ⊢ Prov(p¬R(Dec(1, c)q) (By fact 3)
But it is impossible by the first half of this proof, so R(n) is not provable.
Therefore R(n) is neither provable nor refutable.
Formalizing Paradox 4
Consider the open formula:
(∀z < x)Prov
(
Neg(Subs(y, pxq, pzq))
)
→ Prov
(
Neg(y)
)
Apply Lemma 5, we will get an open formula F(x) with one variable x such
that:
⊢ F(x)←→
[
(∀z < x)Prov
(
p¬F(z)q
)
→ Prov
(
p¬F(x)q)
)]
Roughly speaking, F(n) is related to the proposition “there will be a class
inspection at the (n + 1)st day”13. And it satisfies the condition that if it is
deducible that there is no class inspection at the first n day, then it is deducible
that there is no class inspection at the (n+ 1)st day.
Then we have the following result:
Theorem 12. ∃xF(x) is undecidable.
To prove this theorem, we need the following fact:
Proposition 13 (The Least Number Principle). For any open formula P (x)
with exactly one free variable x, it is provable that ∃xP (x)→ ∃x
(
P (x) ∧ (∀y <
x)¬P (y)
)
.
13Note that we count from 0.
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The proof of this principle, which can be found in Boolos [1993], is skipped
here. Now we can prove Theorem 12.
Proof. Suppose ∃xF(x) is provable, then by the Least Number Principle, ∃x
(
F(x)∧
(∀z < x)¬F(z)
)
is also provable.
By the ω-consistency, there is a natural number n such that the formula
(∀z < n)¬F(z) ∧ F(n) is provable. Then (∀z < n)¬F(z) is provable, by substi-
tution and modus ponens we have ¬F(0),¬F(1), . . . ,¬F(n−1) are all provable.
Hence by Lemma 3, Prov(p¬F(0)q), P rov(p¬F(1)q), . . . , P rov(p¬F(n−1)q) are
all provable, so is (∀z < n)Prov(p¬F(z)q).
Since F(n) is also provable, we have:
⊢ F(n)⇒ ⊢
[
(∀z < n)Prov
(
p¬F(z)q
)
→ Prov
(
p¬F(n)q)
)]
(By the choie of F(x))
⇒ ⊢ Prov
(
p¬F(n)
)
(By modus ponens)
⇒ ⊢ ¬F(n) (By Lemma 4)
So we get a contradiction, and ∃xF(x) is not provable.
On the other hand, suppose ∃xF(x) is refutable. Then ¬∃xF(x), and equiv-
alently, ∀x¬F(x) are provable. For any natural number n, we have:
⊢ ¬F(n) (By universal instantiation)
⇒ ⊢ (∀z < n)Prov
(
p¬F(z)q
)
∧ ¬Prov(p¬F(n)q) (By the choice of F(x))
⇒ ⊢ ¬Prov(p¬F(n)q) (By conjunction elimination)
But by Lemma 3, ¬F(n) is provable implies that Prov(p¬F(n)q) is also prov-
able. Again we get a contradiction.
Therefore, ∃xF(x) is undecidable.
With some modifications on the definition of F(x), we can obtain a for-
malization of the Surprise Examination paradox which is essentially different
from the one in Fitch [1964], since the former is undecidable but the latter is
refutable.
5 Summary
We have seen four infinitary paradoxes, and four related open formulas, P(x),
Q(x), R(x), and F(x). The first three open formulas lead to infinitely many
undecidable sentences, and for the last one we have an undecidable sentence
∃xF(x).
These results partly confirm Go¨del’s claim quoted in the first section, and
refute a possible counterexample from Fitch [1964]. Also, it is interesting to
investigate whether there is any other paradox like the paradox 2, and to un-
derstand the difference between paradox 2 and the Truth-teller.
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